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THE CHALLENGE OF WHITE COLLAR
SENTENCING
ELLEN S. PODGOR*
Sentencing white collar offenders is difficult in that the economic crimes
committed clearly injured individuals, but the offenders do not present a
physical threat to society. This Article questions the necessity of giving
draconian sentences, in some cases in excess of twenty-five years, to non-
violent first offenders who commit white collar crimes. The attempts by the
U.S. Sentencing Commission to achieve a neutral sentencing methodology,
one that is class-blind, fails to respect the real differences presented by
these offenders. As the term "white-collar crime" has sociological roots, it
is advocated here that sociology needs to be a component in the sentencing
of white collar offenders.
1. INTRODUCTION
White collar offenders in the United States have faced sentences far
beyond those imposed in prior years.' For example, Bernard Ebbers,
former CEO of WorldCom, was sentenced to twenty-five years;2 Jeffrey
Skilling, former CEO of Enron, was sentenced to twenty-four years and
four months; 3 and Adelphia founder John Rigas received a sentence of
* Associate Dean of Faculty Development and Distance Education, Stetson University
College of Law. The author thanks the participants in the Culverhouse Chair Lecture, the
Oxford Roundtable, and the Fifteenth Annual National Seminar on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. She also specifically thanks Professors Robert Batey, Douglas Berman, Peter
Henning, and Michael Seigel for their comments throughout the drafting of this paper and
also research assistant Todd Howard. Finally she thanks Dean Darby Dickerson and Stetson
University College of Law for their support throughout the writing of this Article.
1 Ivan Boesky received a sentence of three years and Michael Milken received a sentence
of ten years in cases related to insider trading. See Krysten Crawford, Ebbers: Wrong Place,
Wrong Time, CNNMONEY.COM, July 13, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/O7/08/news/
newsmakers/ebbers.walkup.
2 The Second Circuit upheld the sentence of Bernard Ebbers. See United States v.
Ebbers, 458 F.3d I 10 (2d Cir. 2006).
3 See John R. Emshwiller, Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prison, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2006,
at Cl.
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fifteen years, with his son Timothy Rigas, the CFO of the company,
receiving a twenty-year sentence.4
These greatly increased sentences result in part from the employment
of the United States sentencing guidelines structure, which includes in the
computation of time the amount of fraud loss suffered.5  Although the
sentencing guidelines have some flexibility resulting from the recent
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker,6 the culture of
mandated guidelines still permeates the structure and, as such, prominently
advises the judiciary.7 Equally influential in these sentences is the fact that
because parole no longer exists in the federal system, the time given to
these individuals will likely be in close proximity to the sentence that they
will serve. 8
Although many are quick to denounce the conduct of these individuals
and desire lengthy retributive sentences, their disgust with this criminality
often overlooks a commonality among these white collar offenders. Each
of these individuals has no history of prior criminal conduct. The corporate
white collar offenders of today are typically individuals who have never
been convicted of criminal conduct and are now facing incredibly long
4 See Posting of Sentencing of John and Timothy Rigas to White Collar Crime Prof
Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2005/06/sentencing-of j-1.
html (June 20, 2005). Although this piece focuses on white collar offenders in the corporate
environment, one also finds exorbitant sentences for individuals convicted of white collar
activity that did not involve a corporate matter. For example, Chalana McFarland, an
individual convicted in a mortgage scheme, received a sentence of thirty years. See also
Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, N. Dist. Ga., Closing Attorney Sentenced to 30 Years
in Prison in $20 Million Mortgage Fraud (Aug. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/gan/press/2005/08-24-2005.html.
5 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2B 1.1. Arguably the sentences in the state
system have also increased. L. Dennis Kozlowski, the former CEO of Tyco, received a
sentence of eight to twenty-five years. See Posting of Considering the Kozlowski & Swartz
Sentence to White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
whitecollarcrime-blog/2005/09/consideringthe.html (Sept. 25, 2005) (discussing the
sentencing of Dennis Kozlowski); see also Dan Mitchell, Doing Executive Time, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/24/technology/
24online.ready.html?ex= 1177128000&en=8403d4d0dd 1 d8f3c&ei=5070.
6 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
7 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON
FEDERAL SENTENCING vi (2006) ("The majority of federal cases continue to be sentenced in
conformance with the sentencing guidelines.").
8 Although Michael Milken received a ten-year sentence, he only served twenty-two
months. See Crawford, supra note 1. Charles Keating, who received a twelve-and-a-half-
year sentence, served four-and-a-half months. Id. Keating's conviction was reversed. See
United States v. Keating, 147 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1998).
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sentences as first offenders. 9  The sentences imposed on these first
offenders for economic crimes can exceed the sentences seen for violent
street crimes, such as murder or rape.'°
In an effort to crack down on white collar criminality, the courts and
legislature have produced draconian sentences that place prominence on the
activity involved. In contrast to the approach taken with recidivist statutes
such as "three strikes" laws," the focus in white collar sentencing is on the
offense, with little recognition given to the clean slate of these offenders.
12
This Article, in Section II, traces the history of the term "white collar
crime," noting its sociological roots.' 3 It contrasts this approach with the
way the term "white collar crime" is used today. This section recognizes
the deficiencies in a biased methodology that uses factors such as a person's
wealth to determine whether the person should face criminal charges or
punishment. It notes, however, that a rejection of bias in the sentencing
process does not necessitate the elimination of all sociological
considerations, especially those that might promote legitimate differences.
Section III moves to a discussion of the white collar offender in the
corporate world.' 4 It looks at the realities and risks faced by this offender in
light of the federal sentencing system of today. Section IV extends this
9 This paper is limited to federal corporate white collar offenders. Although it is unlikely
that the level of recidivism is comparable to "street crime" in the general category of white
collar crime, this paper only looks at corporate-related white collar sentencing. One does
find some recidivism in white collar crime cases outside the corporate context. See, e.g.,
Posting of Arms Export Control Act Conviction to White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2006/03/arms-export-con.html (Mar. 22,
2006) (discussing a second prosecution for an arms export violation in which the accused
had been deported in 1998 after a first prosecution for a similar offense).
10 The Second Circuit, in upholding the conviction of former WorldCom CEO Bernard
Ebbers, stated that the sentence of "[tlwenty-five years is a long sentence for a white collar
crime, longer than the sentences routinely imposed by many states for violent crimes,
including murder, or other serious crimes such as serial child molestation." See United
States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away
the Key, 116 YALE L.J. 279 (Pocket Part 2007), available at http://thepocketpart.org/
2007/02/2 1/podgor.html.
I1 In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), the defendant was sentenced to twenty-
five years to life for a theft conviction that involved taking three golf clubs worth $399
apiece. Because he had two or more "serious" or "violent" prior offenses, the recidivist
"three strikes" statute was used in sentencing him for the present offense. Id. at 18-20.
12 Arguably the sentence would be higher if the person had a criminal history. But this
makes little difference as the individuals receiving the sentence are being given in essence a
sentence of spending the rest of their life in prison. These first offenders are thus given little
benefit for being in Category One of the federal sentencing guidelines and being a first
offender.
13 See infra Section It.
14 See infra Section III.
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discussion, looking at factors that could enhance sentencing in white collar
cases. 15 Offered are sociological considerations that provide alternatives to
the cold numerical system of "loss" as the key element used in determining
the sentence of a convicted white collar offender. Although some of this
discussion applies equally to other federal offenders, especially those
sentenced in drug cases,' 6 the focus of this piece is exclusively on white
collar crime.
White collar sentences need to be reevaluated. In an attempt to
achieve a neutral sentencing methodology, one that is class-blind, a system
has evolved in the United States that fails to recognize unique qualities of
white collar offenders, fails to balance consideration of both the acts and the
actors, and subjects these offenders to draconian sentences that in some
cases exceed their life expectancy. In essence, the mathematical
computations that form the essence of sentencing in the federal system fail
to recognize the sociological roots of white collar crime.
II. WHITE COLLAR CRIME: DEVELOPING THE SOCIOLOGICAL ROOTS
White collar crime is a relatively new concept. Yet despite its recent
vintage, it has not been consistently approached by all constituencies.
Initially a sociological concept, "white collar crime" is recognized today as
a legal term. Translating the sociological concept into a legal one presents
deficiencies when placed in the context of the federal sentencing guidelines
structure.
A. SUTHERLAND'S APPROACH
Crucial to any discussion regarding white collar crime is an
understanding of its meaning. This term was initially a sociological term
coined by sociologist Edwin Sutherland, whose theme was to recognize
crime committed by individuals in positions of power.17  Although the
examples in his initial book were limited to corporations, he argued
generically that improper activities in this context should not be considered
merely civil wrongs. 18 This was criminal conduct, and he wanted it
designated as such. 19
15 See infra Section IV.
16 See generally KATE STITH & JOSt A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 69-70 (1998).
17 Sutherland defined white collar crime as "crime committed by a person of
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation." EDWIN H.
SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 9 (1949).
18 Id.
19 Sutherland's initial study of white collar crime was presented to show that crime was
not "due to poverty and its related pathologies." Id. at 10. He stated that a "study of white
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Sutherland looked at the offender in designating the conduct as
criminal and used a class-based component in his definition. He factored
the individual's "high social status" into his definition. Sutherland's
sociological approach to white collar crime emphasized criminal acts by
those in the "upper socioeconomic class," advocating that these individuals
should not escape criminal prosecution.2 °
What is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Sutherland's work is
that a scholar needed to proclaim that crimes of the "upper socioeconomic
class" were in fact crimes that should be prosecuted. It is apparent that
prior to the coining of the term "white collar crime," wealth and power
allowed some persons to escape criminal liability.
B. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROACH
Since Sutherland's 1939 speech to the American Sociological
Society 21 and his later book on the topic of white collar crime,22 there have
been many definitions used to explain this category of crime.23 In contrast
to the offender-based approach favored by Sutherland, the more recent legal
definitions of white collar crime focus on the offense. As such, tax evasion
can be a white collar crime irrespective if it is the hotel owner who fails to
report all of her income or the waiter who fails to report all of his tips.
Arguably, an offense-based approach allows for a neutral methodology that
is not influenced by a person's class and is not conditioned on political or
corporate influence.
What is particularly problematic about the existing offense-based
approach is that there is no list of white collar offenses. Thus, arguing that
the act determines the designation but having no clear list of crimes
included and excluded leaves one not knowing if a crime should or should
not be considered when discussing the topic of white collar crime.14 This
collar crime may assist in locating those factors which, being common to the crimes of the
rich and the poor, are most significant for a general theory of criminal behavior." Id.
20 See id. at 264-66.
21 Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, Speech at the Thirty-Fourth Annual
Presidential Address to the American Sociological Society (Dec. 27, 1939), in 5 AM. Soc.
REV. 1, 1 (1940).
12 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 17.
23 See generally David T. Johnson & Richard A. Leo, The Yale White-Collar Crime
Project: A Review and Critique, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 63, 65-69 (1993) (describing
varying definitions of the term "white collar crime").
24 The Yale Studies on White Collar Crime conducted in the 1970s used as the basis for
its study eight crimes: "antitrust offenses, securities and exchange fraud, postal and wire
fraud, false claims and statements, credit and lending institution fraud, bank embezzlement,
IRS fraud, and bribery." Stanton Wheeler, David Weisburd & Nancy Bode, Sentencing the
White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric and Reality, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 641, 642 (1982).
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problem is perhaps exacerbated by the increasing number of offenses in the
federal system, many of which exist outside of Title 18, the federal criminal
code.25
White collar crime definitions often recognize the economic nature of
this type of crime. Key components tend to be "deception and absence of
physical force. 26  But when examining a criminal statute such as the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), determining
whether the offense fits the white collar crime category may be dependent
on the specific conduct involved. If the conduct is fraud and the predicate
act is mail or wire fraud, it should be designated as a white collar crime.27
When, however, the RICO predicate relates to a state-based offense such as
murder or robbery, it should clearly be outside the realm of being a white
28collar crime. As such, looking at the specific statute in the abstract may
not determine whether the activity should be called a white collar crime.
The circumstances of the conduct may be equally important in categorizing
the activity.
One finds a noticeable discrepancy in the way the Department of
Justice (DOJ) recognizes white collar crime. First, in DOJ literature, there
is no explicit category called "white collar crime," yet there is continual
usage of this term.29 Second, the Trac Reporting System of the DOJ
includes antitrust and fraud as white collar crime but fails to include
corruption as well as a host of other criminal activity that most people
would consider as belonging to this category. 30  The DOJ also does not
include environmental offenses, bribery, federal corruption, procurement
corruption, state and local corruption, immigration violations, money
laundering, OSHA violations, or copyright violations as white collar
25 See TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, A.B.A., THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 2 (1998) (discussing how "over forty percent of
[criminal statutes] have been created since 1970"). One finds criminal statutes throughout
the criminal code, as in, for example, the statutes pertaining to tax, antitrust, environmental,
and securities.
26 JOHN KANE & APRIL D. WALL, THE 2005 NATIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 1 (2006), available at http://www.nw3c.org/research/national public-survey.cfm.
27 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B) (2000) (designating the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, as predicate acts of RICO).
28 See id. § 1961(1)(A) (designating several state offenses as predicate acts for RICO).
29 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2002 PERFORMANCE REPORT/FY 2003REVISED
FINAL PERFORMANCE PLAN/FY 2004 PERFORMANCE PLAN 17 (2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2002/pdf/FullReport.pdf (discussing DOJ priorities
including the area of white collar crime).
30 See Program Category, http://tracfed.syr.edu/help/codes/progcode.html (last visited
Aug. 14, 2007) (listing designations for reporting criminal conduct).
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crime. 3' Each of these forms of criminal conduct is reported in separate
categories exclusive of white collar crime.32 Thus, when the Trac Reporting
System finds a "decline of about ten percent from FY 2003 to FY 2004" in
white collar crime, the omission of many categories raises doubts about the
accuracy of the reporting methodology.
33
Even subdivisions of the DOJ do not concur with the existing reporting
system. For example, the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern
District of California includes public corruption within its prosecutions of
white collar crime.34 This same office also includes environmental
offenses, as well as crimes concerning the Food and Drug Administration as
white collar crime, and reports on their white collar prosecutions explicitly
using this designation.35
C. AN UNBIASED SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH
Historically, class was a component of the definition of white collar
crime. The offender's position of power allowed the person committing the
crime to be labeled a white collar offender. With the present focus on the
offense, the accused's background, uniqueness, and circumstances often are
omitted in categorizing the crime as either a white or non-white collar
crime.
An offense-based approach, as opposed to an offender-based approach,
provides the clearest attempt to achieve neutrality. It eliminates class,
political influence, gender, and race from determining whether individuals
fall within the ranks of being designated a white collar offender. In
omitting these biases, however, it may also fail to account for real
differences that might need recognition to fully understand this category of
criminal conduct. 36  In moving to a strict offense-based analysis and
discarding a sociological approach that is premised on improper biases, the
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, TIMELY NEW JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT DATA SHOW PROSECUTIONS CLIMB DURING BUSH YEARS (2005),
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/136/ (reporting that white collar crime prosecutions
declined during the stated time period).
34 See U.S. Attorney's Office, N. Dist. of Cal., http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/divisions/
criminal.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
35 Id.
36 See also Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker Federal
Guidelines World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REv. 691, 691-98 (2006) (describing inherent gender
differences when sentencing men and women the same for identical crimes).
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existing system omits consideration of legitimate offender differences. This
same problem is reflected in the federal sentencing system.37
III. OFFENDER SENTENCING REALITIES AND RISKS
The white collar offender in the corporate sphere is usually a person
with power, although the level of power within the corporate world can be
very different depending on the person's rank and the corporate structure.38
He or she can be a CEO who has delegated the power to underlings or a
corporate executive who prefers to maintain a high level of control. The
offender can also be a rogue employee who seeks to secure individual profit
without consideration of the harm being caused to others. Perhaps the
saddest cases are those employees who commit criminal acts in an attempt
to please their bosses or show their value to the company. This latter group
can include those who receive no direct or consequential benefit from the
criminal activity. They have the power to commit the illegal conduct but
receive little reward.
This next section starts by looking at the individual offender and his or
her culpability. Considered is the role of the offender in the timeline of
corporate corruption and whether the individual had a self-profit motive for
engaging in the criminal conduct. Finally, the realities of sentencing are
discussed, including the risk of proceeding to trial or accepting the sure
finality of a plea agreement.
A. THE OFFENDER
The defendants in corporate fraud accounting cases are basically law-
abiding citizens who have not had criminal problems in the past. For
example, both Bernard Ebbers and Jeffrey Skilling were first offenders. 39 If
defendants who commit corporate frauds had been caught early in their
schemes, the damages might not have been as significant as represented in
so many of these cases. The crimes committed by those in the corporate
world often present larger social harms because of the great number of
37 See generally Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58
STAN. L. REV. 37 (2005) (discussing the functions and goals of a sentencing system).
38 See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, In Enron's Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial,
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 401-33 (2006) (providing data of prosecutions of
corporate individuals from March 2002 through January 2006).
39 See Peter J. Henning, White Collar Sentences After Booker: Was the Sentencing of
Bernie Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37 McGEORGE L. REv. 757, 757-58 (2006) (discussing that
Bernard Ebbers had no prior criminal convictions); Douglas Berman, Enron: The Tale of
Two Sentencings, Sentencing Law and Policy, Oct. 19, 2006, available at http://sentencing.




victims and the enormous economic loss to these victims. 40 Clearly, many
individuals lost pension funds and life savings as a result of these
wrongdoings. 41 Likewise, it is evident that sharp punishment is in order to
deter this criminal conduct.
Defendants charged with corporate frauds seldom require a court-
appointed attorney as their wealth places them in an above-average
socioeconomic level. Yet because they are at the top, they have farther to
fall.
In addition to the powerful position that these individuals may hold,
white collar offenders can often be subject to collateral consequences. 42 If
lawyers, they are likely to lose their ability to practice law.43  If
stockbrokers, it is unlikely that they will be able to return to their
profession.44 And if part of the medical field, the government may exclude
them from federal programs.45 Unlike the plumber or gardener, a white
collar offender is often unable to return to his or her livelihood after serving
imprisonment. Licensing, debarment, and government exclusion from
benefits may preclude these professionals from resuming the livelihoods
held before their convictions. White collar offenders often receive a higher
sentence for having a skill, and they can suffer additionally by the collateral
consequences that accompany that skill.
46
40 See J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The
Justifications for Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1295, 1298 (2005) (presenting estimates of damage caused by white collar crime). The
Federal Bureau of Investigation notes that eighteen cases by themselves have caused investor
losses of one billion dollars. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Taking Stock (Mar. 3,
2004), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/march04/stock030404.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2007).
41 See Penalties for White Collar Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime and
Drugs of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 5, 9 (2002), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=280 (statement of Charles Prestwood, former
Enron employee; statement of Janice Farmer, former Enron employee).
42 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDARDS, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS, available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/collateralblk.html# 1.1.
43 The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that it is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 8.4(b) (2005).
44 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979)
(discussing the right of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to censure and suspend
individuals from practicing before the SEC).
45 See, e.g., Greene v. Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (upholding the




Re-entry into society can also be problematic for the white collar
offender. While some criminal defendants may think of criminal charges as
"catching a case," and, as such, acceptable in society,47 the white collar
offender's country club society is often gone when the person completes his
or her sentence. Also, because of the power and prestige held by the
corporate-related offender, the person is more likely to feel a greater shame
in the community.48  Being a "front-pager" can subject the individual to
more scrutiny and negative publicity, something that might not be felt by
individuals of lesser status in society.49
Clearly these factors are not persuasive to the general public, as
wealth, education, and prestige are often cited as reasons for giving white
collar offenders a harsher punishment. The lack of sympathy from the
general public makes white collar offenders easy targets for increased
punishment.
B. THE OFFENDER'S CULPABILITY
There are a wide range of different offenders, each demonstrating
different levels of culpability. One finds the mid- to upper-level executive
who is heavily involved in the criminal conduct but does not hold the
position of CEO.50 Then there is the CEO who may not be the one who
devises the scheme but tolerates or promotes it by his or her high level in
46
If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner
that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels.
This adjustment may not be employed if an abuse of trust or skill is included in the base offense
level or specific offense characteristic. If this adjustment is based upon an abuse of a position of
trust, it may be employed in addition to an adjustment under § 3B1 .1 (Aggravating Role); if this
adjustment is based solely on the use of a special skill, it may not be employed in addition to an
adjustment under § 3B 1I (Aggravating Role).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 3B1.3 (2005).
47 See Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L.
REv. 983, 998 (2004) (describing how catching a case may be thought of as catching a
common cold).
48 The shame may also be felt by the offender's family. See generally Darryl K. Brown,
Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1383 (2002) (discussing the
consequences to third parties who are associated with an offender).
49 In this regard, having increased shaming penalties might assist in deterring white
collar offenders. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A
Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999).
50 An example of such an individual would be Andrew Fastow, the former treasurer at




the company. 5' There is also the mid- to lower-level individual who
participates in the conduct for personal gain or promotion within the
company but is not the key player in devising the corporate scheme.
Finally, some white collar offenders commit their acts because they want to
impress their superiors by showing inflated company profits. This last type
of individual may not actually be receiving a personal benefit beyond
company recognition.
An example of such a corporate white collar scenario is found in the
story of Jamie Olis, the former Senior Director of Tax Planning and
International at Dynegy, who later served as its Vice President of Finance.52
Olis "was in his third year at [Dynegy]" when he went to work on Project
Alpha. 53 "Project Alpha was a plan to borrow $300 million and make it
appear to the outside world (and in particular to Dynegy's auditor Arthur
Andersen) as if the money was generated by Dynegy's business
operations. 54 The fraudulent accounting scheme came to a halt when the
"SEC required Dynegy to restate the cash flow as derived from a
'financing' rather than 'operations.' ' 55 The effect was that "Dynegy was
now seen to be borrowing rather than earning money from Project Alpha.,
56
The scheme, involving special purpose entities, "a parent level hedge," and
tear-up agreements, which were meant to protect banks from losing money,
was suddenly facing a decreasing stock price. 7
Olis, along with his boss Gene Foster and co-worker Helen Sharkey,
were indicted for their conduct relating to this accounting fraud.58 Foster, a
key witness against Olis at his trial,59 and the individual who approved his
work,60 received a sentence of fifteen months in return for his plea and
61 6cooperation. Sharkey received a sentence of one month.62 Olis, who did
51 See United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that
Adelson was not the individual who "hatched" the scheme).
52 United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 2005).
53 Mr. Olis' Initial Sentencing Memorandum at 5, United States v. Olis, 2005 WL
5568902 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2005) (No. 03-CR-217).
14 Olis, 429 F.3d at 541.
" Id. at 542.
56 id.
57 Id. The evidence conflicted as to whether Arthur Andersen and others were aware of
the defendant's conduct. Id. at 542-43.
58 Id. at 542.
59 id.
60 Mr. Olis' Initial Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 53, at 5.
61 See Posting of Former Dynegy Executives Receive Lighter Sentences to White Collar
Crime Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrimeblog/2006/01 /




not enter a plea and went to trial, initially received a sentence of 292
months. 63 This over-twenty-four-year sentence was given for convictions
of securities fraud, mail and wire fraud, and conspiracy.
64
Despite having no prior criminal record, thus being a level one
offender under the sentencing guidelines, Olis received this high sentence
because the court determined that he caused a loss of $105 million to one
shareholder, the University of California Retirement System.65 The high
sentence was also in part a function of the court finding that "Olis employed
'sophisticated means' and a 'special skill' to carry out the fraud; and that
there were more than fifty victims of the fraud., 66 Although the conviction
was affirmed, the case was remanded for re-sentencing.67 Circuit Judge
Edith Jones rejected the "district court's approach to the loss calculation"
because it failed to "take into account the impact of extrinsic factors on
Dynegy's stock price decline. 68
Olis was eventually re-sentenced to seventy-two months, with the
court concluding "that it [was] not possible to estimate with reasonable
certainty the actual loss to shareholders attributable" to the fraudulent
scheme. 69 The court chose to base the sentence instead on an "intended loss
to the United States Treasury of $79 million.,
70
In some cases, the defendants will have realized significant personal
profits from the criminal conduct.71 Other cases, like that of Olis, have
individuals seeking to enhance a company with insignificant personal
benefit.72 The personal benefit may be limited to bonuses, promotions, or
raises resulting from high company performance.
63 Olis, 429 F.3d at 541.
64 id.
65 Id. at 542-43.
66 Id. at 542.
67 Id. at 541.
68 Id. at 548-49.
69 United States v. Olis, No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 2716048, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22,
2006), aff'g in part, rev "g in part 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005).
70 Id. at *10.
71 Andrew Fastow's plea agreement called for him to forfeit assets "which have an
approximate value of $23,800,000 and constitute proceeds of the offenses to which he will
plead guilty." See Plea Agreement at 8, United States v. Fastow, No. H-02-0665 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 14, 2004), available at http://fli.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/
usafastow 11404plea.pdf.
72 In Olis the court stated:
Although Olis was intimately involved in the conspiracy and in planning Project Alpha, he did
not have the ultimate authority at Dynegy to approve Project Alpha, nor was he responsible for
drafting the documents by which the conspiracy was carried out and concealed. Moreover,
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When a CEO or high-level executive stumbles onto fraudulent activity,
discovering the fraud places the CEO in the difficult position of protecting
the company while not perpetuating the activity. The court in United States
v. Adelson described the former Chief Operating Officer and President of
Impath, Inc., a company involved in cancer diagnosis testing, as having
been "sucked into the fraud not because he sought to inflate the company's
earnings, but because, as President of the company, he feared the effects of
exposing what he had belatedly learned was the substantial fraud
perpetrated by others. 73 Judge Rakoff, the district court judge authoring
the opinion in this case, took the bold step of moving away from the
mathematics of the sentencing guidelines to factor in all aspects of offender
culpability. 74 The government, however, has filed a notice of appeal in this
case.
75
The convicted defendants in all these cases were clearly speeding
down the corporate highway. The fact that others might speed is irrelevant.
The fact that there is no intent to hurt someone is also unimportant. The
overriding fact is that they engaged in illegalities and a wreck occurred. If
the sentencing guidelines are strictly adhered to, the consequences of the
wreck determine the sentence imposed.76
C. CAUGHT IN THE POST-SARBANES-OXLEY NET
Most criminal laws are written reactively-an event happens, and
Congress provides legislation to appease the public. Whether it be the
unlike some other recently publicized corporate fraud cases, the purpose of this conspiracy was
not to defraud Dynegy or to enrich Olis.
Memorandum Opinion, United States v. Olis, Case 4:03-cr-00217 *29-30 (Sept. 22, 2006),
available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2006/09/more-on_
olis.html.
73 United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
74 Id. at 512-13. The court imposed a "sentence of 42 months imprisonment... plus
restitution in the amount of $50 million, immediate forfeiture of $1.2 million, three years of
supervised release to follow imprisonment, and a life-time ban from being an officer or
director of a public company." Id. at 507.
75 Tom Perrotta, Judge Rejects Executive's 85-Year Guideline Sentence as "Travesty of
Justice, " N.Y. L.J., July 27, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id
=1154077535388.
76 The crimes here are not strict liability offenses, like speeding, but the intent to harm
and the intent to profit may also not be required in the white collar crime. The statutes
involved usually require an intent to commit the act and knowledge of the illegality
occurring within the corporation. These requirements, however, can be inferred from




Patriot Act,77 Megan's Law,78 or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 79 the legislation
in these instances was an outgrowth of the public outcry for retribution for
criminal conduct.8 0 In some cases, the media influence and public desire
for legislation are less noted, as when Congress passes laws requested by
the DOJ to provide more efficient prosecution. For example, although
mail8 ' and wire 2 fraud statutes exist, Congress passed a health fraud statute
that specifically authorizes prosecutions relating to the health care
industry. 83 Although a specific event did not trigger this legislation, the
high cost of medical services may have influenced a reexamination of this
industry.
The passage of new laws places certain individuals in greater jeopardy
for being held criminally culpable. Although the United States prohibits ex
post facto prosecutions, ongoing activity can become subject to new
legislation after its passage. There is no grandfathering in of future criminal
conduct. Thus, criminal activity that occurs after the passage of the statute
becomes fair game for prosecutors.
Even without new legislation, prosecutors can use generic statutes to
reach conduct that may not have been the subject of prior criminal
prosecutions. As stated by Chief Justice Burger, "[w]hen a 'new' fraud
develops-as constantly happens-the mail fraud statute becomes a
stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon,
until particularized legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly
with the evil."8 4
Further, when the criminal activity has a historical basis in a
corporation or is part of the "corporate ethos," those initially caught in the
government net provide the general deterrence for later violators.8 5 With
sufficient notice of the criminal activity provided by the very passage of the
legislation, the initial group of individuals prosecuted for crimes cannot
successfully argue that they were deprived of due process notice. On the
77 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
78 Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996).
79 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
80 Arguably one could also say that the passage of these pieces of legislation correlates to
political influences.
" 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
82 Id. at § 1343.
83 Id. at § 1347.
84 United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 406-07 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
85 See Pam Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1095, 1095-1147, 1182-83 (1991).
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other hand, those prosecuted after these first few offenders have the benefit
of hearing about the prosecutions to realize the impropriety of these acts.
This is particularly important in white collar regulatory offenses, which
might not, by their very nature, be immediately seen as criminal activity.
86
This is also true for new business crimes that might, in prior years, have
been subject only to civil penalties.
The bottom line is that the prosecution cycle needs to start somewhere
and the unfortunate individual who happens to go first is just unfortunate.
There is no credit received for being the initial recipient of criminal
prosecution. After all, these individuals have engaged in criminal activity.
Those caught in the initial net thrown into the sea of criminal conduct
are likely to be offenders who understood their conduct might not be proper
but did not realize it could produce criminal charges and draconian
sentences. Although the statutes used, such as mail or wire fraud, may have
been on the books for many years, 87 the statutes' application to this form of
criminality may be new.
It is important to note here that in many instances, if corporate controls
had been properly in place, the individual criminality would not have been
able to pass under the radar. If, in fact, the corporation had an effective
corporate compliance program, the criminality would have been seen well
before the government prosecution.88 The federal sentencing reality,
86 When there is a complicated statute, and the conduct might be questionable as
legitimate or illegitimate, the Supreme Court has imposed a higher level of mens rea if an
individual presents an "ignorance of the law" defense. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S.
192, 200 (1991) (holding that tax laws are complicated and that a "willful" violation of the
law requires the jury be instructed on the requirement of finding a "specific intent to violate
the law"); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994) ("To establish that a
defendant 'willfully violat[ed]' the antistructuring law, the Government must prove that the
defendant acted with knowledge that this conduct was unlawful.").
87 Mail fraud has been a crime since the statute was enacted in 1872. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343 (2000).
88 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2006) (describing the criteria for
an effective compliance and ethics program). Paula Desio, Deputy General Counsel of the
United States Sentencing Commission, describes the seven key criteria for an effective
program as:
(I) Compliance standards and procedures reasonably capable of reducing the prospect of
criminal activity
(2) Oversight by high-level personnel
(3) Due Care in delegating substantial discretionary authority
(4) Effective Communication to all levels of employees
(5) Reasonable steps to achieve compliance, which include systems for monitoring, auditing, and
reporting suspected wrongdoing without fear of reprisal
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however, is that the guidelines do not consider the existence, or lack
thereof, of general deterrent punishment education received by the offender.
Although individuals may be at different places along the spectrum of
government enforcement against fraudulent activity, this is irrelevant for
sentencing purposes.
Individuals are sentenced by looking at the offense, with add-ons 89 for
items such as being a skilled person,90 being an organizer or leader,9' or
obstructing the government's investigation.92 The guidelines allow for an
(6) Consistent enforcement of compliance standards including disciplinary mechanisms
(7) Reasonable steps to respond to and prevent further similar offenses upon detection of a
violation.
PAULA DESIO, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL
GUIDELINES, available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf.
89 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 16, at 69 (Professor Kate Stith and the Honorable
Jos& Cabranes note that "the Commission has never explained the rationale underlying any
of its identified specific offense characteristics, why it has elected to identify certain
characteristics and not others, or the weights it has chosen to assign to each identified
characteristic.").
90 Section 3B 1.3 of the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides:
§ 3B1.3. Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill
If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner
that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels.
This adjustment may not be employed if an abuse of trust or skill is included in the base offense
level or specific offense characteristic. If this adjustment is based upon an abuse of a position of
trust, it may be employed in addition to an adjustment under § 3B1 .1 (Aggravating Role); if this
adjustment is based solely on the use of a special skill, it may not be employed in addition to an
adjustment under § 3B 1. 1 (Aggravating Role).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B 1.3.
91 Section 3B1.1 of the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides:
§ 3B1.. Aggravating Role
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows:
(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or
more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the
criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3
levels.
(c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity
other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels.
Id. at § 3B1.1.
92 Section 3C1.1 of the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides:
§ 3Cl.l. Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice
If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the
instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant's
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increased sentence when the points accumulated raise the offense level.93
Although the guidelines provide a downward adjustment for someone in a
minimal role, lack of notice of the criminal conduct, or belief that the
activity is merely acceptable business conduct instead of criminal conduct,
does not diminish the sentence under the guidelines.94 Culpability is to a
large extent an "all-or-nothing" methodology-either the person committed
the criminal conduct or did not.
D. MOTIVE AS A SENTENCING FACTOR
The individual's motive in committing the crime may also be
overlooked in the federal sentencing process. Although motive has never
been a mandate of intent and may not be a factor in determining guilt or
innocence, 9 motive can be a consideration in punishment theory.9 6 The
federal sentencing guidelines, however, do not for the most part examine
the accused's motive, and only creative post-Booker courts have chanced
going down this avenue. As such, the accused that causes an astronomical
loss to the public but gains no individual profit may be treated in a similar
manner to the individual who might be purchasing costly shower curtains
offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense, increase the
offense level by 2 levels.
Id. at § 3C1.1.
93 For example, in United States v. Adelson, the government requested that a first
offender have added twenty-four points for the amount of the loss, six points for there being
more than 250 victims, four points as the defendant "was an officer of a publicly-traded
company," four points for ultimately playing a leadership role, two points for endangering
the financial security of a publicly traded company, two points "because the fraud involved
sophisticated means," and two points for obstructing justice. 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 510
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
94 Section 3B 1.2 of the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides:
§ 3B1.2. Mitigating Role
Based on the defendant's role in the offense, decrease the offense level as follows:
(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity, decrease by 2 levels.
In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3 levels.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B 1.2.
95 See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding
premeditated murder for a crime committed with a motive of taking an ill wife out of her
pain and suffering).
96 "Motive may . . . be relevant as a method to distinguish between the relative
blameworthiness of individuals at sentencing." Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive's Role in




for his home from the profits of his or her corporate fraud.9 7 Circuit Judge
Evans, found in United States v. Corry that motive to the victim is "mostly
irrelevant" and therefore not something to consider in sentencing.9" He
stated, "[i]f someone steals your wallet and gives the money in it to the
Humane Society, rather than blowing it in Las Vegas, that's little comfort
as you gaze at your empty pocket." 99
Some judges, however, do consider the offender's motive in the
sentencing computation. For example, in United States v. Ranum, the court
fully examined the individual defendant, as opposed to merely the offense
and the resultant use of a strict numerical computation.100 Ranum, a senior
bank loan officer in charge of "managing a commercial loan portfolio and
evaluating loan applications,"' 0' was convicted of "misapplication bank
funds."'1 2 He received a year-and-a-day sentence for this criminal conduct,
a sentence imposed shortly after the Court's ruling in Booker.'
0 3
The district court rejected the prosecution request for a guideline
sentence of thirty-seven to forty-six months and also rejected a defense
request for home confinement.' 4 The judge specifically noted that the
"defendant's culpability was mitigated in that he did not act for personal
gain or for improper personal gain of another."' 1 5 Noting the aggravated
sentence provided by the loss amount under the guidelines, the court stated
that "[o]ne of the primary limitations of the guidelines, particularly in
white-collar cases, is their mechanical correlation between loss and offense
level."'1 6  The court noted that "[i]t is true that, ... from the victim's
perspective the loss is the same no matter why it occurred."' 0 7 The court in
Ranum then stated that "from the standpoint of personal culpability, there is
a significant difference."'
0 8
97 Although L. Dennis Kozlowski was sentenced under state law, as opposed to the
federal sentencing guidelines, evidence admitted at his first trial included the alleged
purchase of six thousand dollar shower curtains that were expensed to Tyco International.
See Kevin McCoy, Jury Begins Deliberations in Ex-Tyco Execs' Retrial, USA TODAY, June
3, 2005, at 3B, available at 2005 WLNR 8835521.
98 United States v. Corry, 206 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2000).
99 Id.
1oo See United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
101 Id. at 987.
10' Id. at 988.
103 id.
'04 Id. at 989.






In Ranum, the court considered the history and character of the
defendant. 0 9 Additionally, factors normally omitted in federal sentencing
discussions were mentioned in this case.'10 Significantly, the sentencing
decision was not a mathematical equation but rather presented consideration
of culpability beyond noting that the individual was within Category One.
The court recognized that the accused did not act with a personal motive.
E. RISKING TRIAL
In addition to the loss factor being a crucial component in determining
a sentence, the extent that a person will be punished is also contingent on
whether the individual risks a trial."' Those who go to trial and are not
acquitted face incredibly high sentences. In contrast, those who work with
the government and accept a plea with cooperation can reduce their
sentences substantially. 12 One need only look at the disparity in sentences
between Jeffrey Skilling's sentence of twenty-four years and four months
following a trial and Andrew Fastow's six-year sentence following a plea
and cooperation with the government. 13 As such, in making the decision to
proceed to trial, individuals who believe themselves innocent face
enormous sentencing risks should the jury think otherwise. Although courts
are instructed to "avoid the unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
109 Id.
110 The court noted that the defendant was
fifty years old, had no prior record, a solid employment history, and is a devoted family man. He
has two children, one of whom is still in school. Prior to his recent marriage, he was a single
father who did an excellent job of raising two daughters. He also provides care and support for
his elderly parents.
Id. at 990-91. The court also discusses other factors of mitigation for this sentence. Id.
111 The former CEO of Rite Aid received eight years in prison when he pled guilty to
conspiracy. See Adrian Michaels, Ex-Rite Aid Chief Gets 8-Year Sentence in Fraud Case,
FIN. TIMES USA, May 28, 2004.
112 See United States v. Pacheco, 434 F.3d 106 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2312 (2006); United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005), partially vacated
and remanded; United States v. Green, Sentencing Memoranda, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D.
Mass. 2004), partially vacated. The sentencing memo asserted that "the Department is so
addicted to plea bargaining to leverage its law enforcement resources to an overwhelming
conviction rate that the focus of our entire criminal justice system has shifted far away from
trials and juries and adjudication to a massive system of sentence bargaining that is heavily
rigged against the accused citizen." Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
113 See United States v. Fastow, Sentencing Transcript, CR-H-02-665 (Sept. 26, 2006)
(on file with the author).
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conduct," cooperation can serve as a "reasonable explanation" for a
noticeable sentencing differential.
1 14
Miami banker Eduardo A. Masferrer is an example of an individual
who took the risk of trial. Masferrer was convicted after a jury trial for his
role in a twenty million dollar bank fraud that included concealing the
criminal activity from regulators.11 5 He received a sentence of thirty years,
while the bank president, Juan Carlos Bernac6, who took the route of a plea,
received a six-and-a-half-year sentence.' 16 Defense counsel questioned this
disparity." 7
Taking the risk of going to trial may not be a determination solely
within the province of the individual defendant. As prosecutors tend to
work up the ladder in proceeding against criminal activities, those who are
higher in the corporate hierarchy often stand a greater chance of receiving a
higher sentence. Likewise, those with little or nothing to offer the
government in their plea negotiation may not realize the full benefits that
can accompany government cooperation. 118 These factors have been the
subject of concern long before the recent sentencing of white collar
offenders. 119
Some cases have defendants arguing that higher-ups knew of the
wrongdoing and approved the activity, while other cases have CEO
defendants arguing that they did not know the criminality was occurring
under their reign. This theme can be seen with defendants such as Bernard
Ebbers, former CEO of WorldCom, 120 and Kenneth Lay, former CEO of
Enron, who were both convicted after a jury trial. Richard Scrushy, former
CEO of HealthSouth, was initially acquitted by a jury.1
21
114 United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006).
115 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of Fla. (May 10, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/fls/PressReleases/0605 10-01 .html.
116 See Jane Bussey, Top Banker Gets Stiff Sentence, MIAMI HERALD, July 27, 2006, at
1C.
117 Id.
118 Other considerations can also come into play here. On occasion, there can be a race
to the courthouse to secure a plea agreement favorable to an accused. The sooner one
arrives, the more chance that the individual will receive the better agreement.
119 See Avern Cohn, The Unfairness of "Substantial Assistance," JUDICATURE, Jan.-Feb.
1995, at 186 (describing the many reasons why an individual might not offer substantial
assistance to the government).
120 In Ebbers, the court gave a conscious avoidance instruction premised on Ebbers's
testimony demonstrating that he was "consciously trying to avoid knowledge that the
financial reports were inaccurate." United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir.
2006).
121 Following Scrushy's not-guilty finding in the case against him premised on activities
at HealthSouth, he was retried along with the former governor of Alabama, Don Siegelman,
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Individuals taking the risk of going to trial are not usually schooled in
the realities of the criminal process and the prison system, as they are first
offenders. 22 Deciding whether to take the risk may also be a function of
money, as the cost of legal counsel can influence the ability to spend the
sums necessary for a trial, thus forcing a plea negotiation to preserve assets
for the offender's family.
123
Sentencing in the federal system does not account for the risk taken by
the individual who goes to trial. In fact, it works against this person by
having him or her receive a higher sentence than could have been obtained
if the defendant had not demanded enforcement of the constitutional right to
a jury trial.
An additional factor that compounds this risk is the recent flux of
deferred prosecution agreements. 124  These agreements provide the
corporation with a benefit, often to the detriment of the individual. The
government leverages the corporation against the individual, demanding
total cooperation in its investigation. 125  Corporations agreeing to deferred
and convicted after a jury trial. See Posting of Siegleman and Scrushy-Verdicts In to White
Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2006/06/
siegelmanscrus_ I.html (June 29, 2006).
122 Some may argue that white collar offenders have a better ability to procure a private
high-priced lawyer. This author, however, is unconvinced that private counsel is superior to
the public defender who operates daily in the criminal courthouse.
123 News reports suggested that Enron's former chief accounting officer Richard
Causey's plea was motivated by the cost of attorney fees and his "diminishing resources."
Kristen Hays, Former Enron Executive Pleads Guilty, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Ore.),
Dec. 29, 2005, available at http://www.registerguard.com/news/2005/12/29/bl.bz.enron.
1229.p I.php?section=business.
124 Deferred and non-prosecution agreements operate similarly to plea negotiations in
that the two parties are reaching a binding agreement. In deferred or non-prosecution
agreements, however, there is no indictment, and if the conditions set forth in the agreement
are satisfied, then a criminal case does not proceed. See generally Benjamin M. Greenblum,
What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863 (2005); Eugene Illovsky, Corporate
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, CRIM. JUSTICE, Summer 2006, at 36 (discussing corporate
deferred prosecution agreements).
125 One of the guiding principles set forth in the Thompson Memorandum is that:
[i]n gauging the extent of the corporation's cooperation [for purposes of determining whether it
should be indicted], the prosecutor may consider the corporation's willingness to identify the
culprits within the corporation, including senior executives, to make witnesses available, to
disclose the complete results of its internal investigation, and to waive attorney-client and work-
product privilege.
United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF




prosecution agreements can sometimes become mini-prosecutors in an
effort to appease the government.1
26
IV. MEASURING WRONGFULNESS
The United States Sentencing Commission sets the parameters for a
sentence. Although post-Booker the judiciary has some sentencing
discretion, the mathematical equation under the guidelines is, more often
than not, the norm. In recent years, sentences have increased for many
white collar crimes.1 27 The United States Sentencing Commission's Final
Report on the Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing
attributes two factors to the increased rate of imprisonment in the
fraud/theft category.128  First is the fact that "statutory and guideline
penalties increased for many fraud offenses as a result of the Commission's
Economic Crime Package of 2001, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other
recent legislation. 129 Second is the increased number of prosecutions.
130
The reality of the sentencing guidelines' uniformity is that new legislation
ratchets up sentences to an overall higher level. Also apparent is that
imprisonment is the norm, with little respect given to alternatives that might
better rehabilitate individual wrongdoers.
This next section starts by looking at a pre-guidelines study of
sentencing in white collar cases. It considers the deficiencies of the existing
guideline system, a system premised strictly on a mathematical formula
with little consideration of the individual and his or her culpability. Argued
here is that a system that employs a mathematical calculation to determine
126 "[T]he Thompson Memorandum makes clear that the failure of a business
organization facing possible indictment to induce its personnel to submit to interviews by the
government and to disclose whatever they know may be a factor weighing in favor of
indictment of the entity." Id. at 4. This Memorandum has now been replaced with the
McNulty Memorandum. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Head of Department Components and United States Attorneys, Principles
Of Federal Prosecution For Business Organizations (2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf.
127 When the sentencing guidelines were initially enacted, a goal was to provide
uniformity in the sentences and to "require short but certain terms of confinement for many
white-collar offenders, including tax, insider trading, and antitrust offenders, who previously
would have likely received only probation." Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 20-21
(1988).
128 The average sentence pre-Protect Act for the category theft and fraud under United
States Sentencing Guideline 2Bl.1 was sixteen months. This increased to twenty months
post-Protect Act and twenty-three months post-Booker. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra
note 7, at 71.




an individual's sentence omits proper recognition of the offender, the
offense, and the need to protect society from future dangerousness.
A. PRE-GUIDELINE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR OFFENDERS
The Yale White Collar Crime Studies of the late 1970s conducted
interviews that looked at the judge's rationale in sentencing the non-white
collar offender from that of the white collar offender. 31  Professors
Kenneth Mann, Stanton Wheeler, and Austin Sarat noted that there was a
pronounced difference in the way judges sentenced white collar crime
cases, with the focus being on general deterrence as opposed to other
methodologies. 32 They noted that "[m]ost judges share a widespread belief
that the suffering experienced by the white-collar person as a result of
apprehension, public indictment and conviction, and the collateral
disabilities incident to conviction-loss of job, professional licenses, and
status in the community-completely satisfies the need to punish the
individual.' 33  The study raised issues of "equity in the sentencing
process," specifically noting aspects such as the "use of economic sanctions
when the defendant can clearly pay for them-sanctions that are
unavailable to the defendant who is poor."'
' 34
In an article authored by Stanton Wheeler, David Weisburd, and
Nancy Bode, the odd revelation is presented that "one's socioeconomic
status is positively related to the severity of the sanction."'' 35 In a post-
Watergate world, judges were increasing the penalties of those who
progressed through the system and were charged with a white collar
offense. 1
36
13 1 The study was premised upon interviews conducted with judges. See Kenneth Mann,
Stanton Wheeler, & Austin Sarat, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 479 (1980).
132 They state:
In non-white-collar cases judges have at least three, if not four, purposes in mind when they
impose a sentence-punishment, incapacitation, general deterrence, and occasionally
rehabilitation-and they tend to believe that their sentence will serve each purpose, to some extent
and however imperfectly. In the white-collar area, in distinction, the sentencing purpose and
rationale tends to be unidimensional: judges are concerned with general deterrence, deterring
other persons in similar positions from engaging in the same or like behavior.
Id. at 482.
133 Id. at 484.
114 Id. at 500.
135 Stanton Wheeler, David Weisburd, & Nancy Bode, Sentencing The White Collar
Offender: Rhetoric and Reality, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 641, 657 (1982).
136 Three "interpretations" are presented as possible "hypotheses" for this result: 1) that
this correlation is "meaningless or trivial, because the important effects of socioeconomic




Much has changed in the legal landscape since the Yale studies, most
notably with the institution of the guidelines. These guidelines have moved
sentencing in a direction that embraces "uniformity." 137 Loss controls the
determination of the sentence, and there is little recognition given to
individual offender characteristics.
In many cases, the high-profile corporate CEO or the individual
unwilling to accept a plea and cooperate with the government receives a
high sentence. 38 This is in large part because of the fraud guidelines that
use "loss" as a key factor in sentencing. 139 As noted by Professor Peter
Henning in discussing the sentencing of Bernard Ebbers, former CEO of
WorldCom, "the determination of loss can raise a sentence quickly from
modest to substantial. 1 40 Despite the uncertainty in determining a "loss"
value, 41 the different approaches that exist, 142 and the need to find that the
indictment"; 2) that in a post-Watergate world white collar crime was a priority; and 3) that
judges and the public had a "strong sentiment against crimes of greed rather than need,
against crimes committed by persons in positions of trust and authority." Id. at 657-58.
137 In creating the federal sentencing guidelines, Congress sought to have "honesty in
sentencing" and to "reduce 'unjustifiably wide' sentencing disparity." Breyer, supra note
127, at 4 (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, 54, 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3221, 3237, 3239).
138 Prosecutorial power further skews the system in that the government has the ability to
offer cooperating individuals a 5K 1.1 motion that will take the sentencing outside the formal
structure. A 5KI.1 motion, a tool exclusively within the province of the prosecution,
provides a basis for the court to automatically sentence below the guideline level. Even the
court's ability to depart can be cabined by reasonableness. See United States v. Martin, 455
F.3d 1227 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (finding that a seven-day sentence was unreasonable as not
properly reflecting the seriousness of the criminal activity). The 5KI.1 motion serves as
important leverage for the government in securing favorable plea agreements from
defendants. Additionally, prosecutorial discretion allows the government to pick and choose
the charges against an individual. Plea agreements that set specific charges and specific
amounts of loss allow for a controlled sentence under the guidelines.
139 "The medium loss amounts for cases with loss amounts sufficient to trigger a
sentence increase from the loss table in USSG § 2B 1.1 increased during the three time
periods from $38,060 pre-Protect Act, to $41,595 post-Protect Act, to $54,566 post-Booker."
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 7, at 71.
140 Henning, supra note 39, at 767.
141 In United States v. Olis, the Fifth Circuit noted that the "loss guideline is skeletal
because it covers dozens of federal property crimes." 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005).
142 The Guidelines Commentary provides language for determining a loss. It notes that
"loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss." The Commentary also provides measures
for loss in certain cases, how to estimate the loss, exclusions from loss, and credit against
loss. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3 (2006). Case law,
however, demonstrates different approaches used by the courts in ascertaining loss. See




fraud caused the lOSS, 14 3 the numerical amount can often equate with a
sentence that exceeds the person's life expectancy.
144
The "add-ons" to the loss calculation are equally quantitative.145 For
example, a sentence can increase by two levels for ten or more victims, four
levels for fifty or more victims, and six levels for 250 or more victims. 46 In
some instances, the additional "add-ons" are specific to particular conduct
or a particular statute.
147
In a post-Booker world, courts have received some discretion in
deciding the unreasonableness of a sentence. 48  The extent to which
appellate tribunals will permit this discretion to flourish remains to be
143 Id. at 547 (noting that it is important in securities fraud cases to make certain that loss
used for sentencing correlates with the "actual loss caused in the marketplace, exclusive of
other sources of stock price decline").
144 In the case of Richard P. Adelson, the Honorable Jed Rakoff noted that the
government computed the offense level to be 55, with everything above 42 being "life
imprisonment." United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
145 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B 1,1.
146 See id. at § 2B1.l(a)(l).
147 For example, "theft of, damage to, or destruction of, property from a national
cemetery" and certain computer crime offenses require an increase by two levels. Id. at
§ 2B1.l(b)(6), (14).
148 The Booker decision essentially makes the Guidelines advisory. See United States v.
Martin, 455 F.3d 1227 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (reversing a seven-day sentence given in a white
collar case). Courts determine the reasonableness of sentences outside the guidelines range
using 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which provides in part the following:
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. The court shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2)
of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available; ...
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
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seen.1 49 With white collar offenders bearing the brunt of society's scorn,
using a classless charging and sentencing process remains attractive to the
public.
C. DEFICIENCIES OF A STRICT QUANTITATIVE APPROACH
The one-size-fits-all methodology of sentencing white collar offenders
seriously diminishes consideration of the individual offender, the nature of
the offense, and the level of protection needed to satisfy the public's
interest. It provides a mathematical computation for determining the
sentence without regard to sociological differences.
150
1. Failure to Consider the Offender
The federal sentencing guidelines fail to adequately examine the
individual offender in determining the sentence. Omitted from
consideration are the collateral consequences faced by the offender and the
differences he or she faces upon re-entry into society.1 5 1  The specific
culpability of the individual also is not considered. 5 2 Courts do not focus
on whether the accused had the benefit of seeing prior individuals receive
harsh penalties and thus was able to have the benefit of deterrence prior to
their committing the act, or, alternatively, whether the accused was caught
committing the crime du jour without realizing that the activity is not
acceptable business conduct.
53
Culpability is basically non-existent as a sentencing concern, with the
punishment resting on a numerical figure that correlates with the amount of
loss occurring as a result of the crime. Courts seldom consider where the
individual may be on the corporate ladder, the extent to which he or she is
149 Sandra D. Jordan, Have We Come Full Circle? Judicial Sentencing Discretion
Revived in Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 615 (2006).
150 In United States v. Adelson, the Honorable Jed Rakoff states:
As many have noted, the Sentencing Guidelines, because of their arithmetic approach and also in
an effort to appear "objective," tend to place great weight on putatively measurable quantities,
such as the weight of drugs in narcotics cases or the amount of financial loss in fraud cases,
without, however, explaining why it is appropriate to accord such huge weight to such factors.
441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing STITH & CABRANES, supra note 16, at 69).
The sentencing guidelines have also been criticized as complex. The Constitution Project
Sentencing Initiative recommends simplifying the existing advisory sentencing system. The
Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative, Recommendations for Federal Criminal
Sentencing in a Post-Booker World, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 310 (2006).
151 See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 50-76 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text.
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directly engaged in the criminal conduct,1 54 and any individual profit
obtained as a result of engaging in the improper activity. In essence,
sentencing fails to account for a difference between the CEO heavily
entrenched in the criminal behavior and the CEO with little knowledge of
criminal wrongdoing. Also omitted from the review process is the
motivation of the accused and the actual benefit received by this individual.
2. Failure to Consider the Uniqueness of White Collar Crimes
The failure to focus on the offender is exacerbated by the fact that the
crimes used in white collar cases have little or no flexibility.155 Unlike
many state offenses, there are no degrees or lesser included offenses to
these crimes. For example, a homicide can be many different crimes
dependent upon factors such as heat of passion, deliberation, premeditation,
cooling off period, or extreme emotional disturbance. 156 Irrespective of the
jurisdiction or the grading methodology used, the offense level is adjusted
by the culpability of the accused. An unlawful killing can range from being
considered murder in the first degree, voluntary manslaughter, or reckless
homicide, to perhaps a vehicular homicide, depending on the specific laws
of the jurisdiction.
One does not find these lesser included offenses with white collar
crimes as there are no degrees or levels of punishment.' 57 The classic white
collar crimes-bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud-are not predicated
on lower level crimes with a lesser degree of culpability or extenuating
circumstances. The individual is either guilty or not guilty of the
designated offense.
154 The federal sentencing guidelines do examine whether a person is an organizer or
leader when determining whether additional levels should be added for an aggravating role.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B 1.3 (2006).
155 The movement away from focusing on the offender and looking more closely on
outside constituencies occurred well before the sentencing guidelines. Yale University
Professor Stanton Wheeler in his presidential address to the 24th annual meeting of the
Society for the Study of Social Problems noted that "we have withdrawn attention from the
offender to those who are part of the social control network." Stanton Wheeler, Trends and
Problems in the Sociological Study of Crime, 23 SOC. PROBS. 525 (1976).
156 Many states have different degrees of crimes such as murder or burglary. For
example, when the accused acted with a sudden heat of passion, had no opportunity to cool
off, and acted under adequate provocation, states may designate the killing as voluntary
manslaughter as opposed to murder. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.321 (2004); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 2501 (2006).
157 The leading white collar crimes used in prosecuting this form of conduct are bank





Perhaps the most noticeable characteristic omitted by the quantitative
approach to sentencing is future dangerousness. White collar offenders,
especially those coming from the corporate arena, are usually first
offenders. 158 Additionally, there is little likelihood of recidivism. 5 9 The
individual seldom can resume a position of power that would allow for
continued criminality of this nature.
The court also has the ability to limit any future dangerousness by
precluding the individual from serving in a future corporate position. For
example, in his sentencing of Richard P. Adelson, former Chief Operating
Office and President of Impath, the Honorable Jed Rakoff stated that
"[w]ith [Adelson's] reputation ruined by his conviction, it was extremely
unlikely that he would ever involve himself in future misconduct. Just to be
sure, however, the Court, as part of the sentence here imposed, barred
Adelson from ever again serving as an officer or director of a public
company."'
' 60
If sentencing has as a goal the protection of society, factoring in the
future dangerousness of the individual is an important component of the
system. With the elimination of the individual's corporate role, the
stripping of the convicted felon's money, and the accompanying collateral
consequences, such as a loss of license or ability to conduct business with
the government, future dangerousness is nearly eliminated.
V. CONCLUSION
All of criminal law revolves around punishment theory. We create
laws in order to punish conduct that society finds abhorrent. We then
enforce these laws and punish offenders in order to secure adherence to the
laws. The classic theories consider utilitarian models that encompass goals
of deterrence, both general and specific, rehabilitation, isolation, and
education. 161 On the other hand, there is retributive theory that punishes for
158 The rare example of a white collar corporate related offender being in a Category
Two is seen in the securities fraud case of United States v. Rosen, 409 F.3d 535 (2d Cir.
2005).
159 Fraud offenses were the lowest level of recidivism when compared to robbery,
firearms, drug trafficking, larceny, and robbery. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MEASURING
RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES 30 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/RecidivismGeneral.pdf.
160 United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
161 See Ellen S. Podgor, Peter J. Henning, Andrew E. Taslitz, & Alfredo Garcia,
CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 4-6 (2005).
[Vol. 97
WHITE COLLAR SENTENCING
the sake of "paying the debt to society. 1 62 Punishment theory is also multi-
dimensional, with considerations of communicative retribution looking at
not only the specific wrongs to victims but also the repercussions to society
and groups within society that might suffer as a result of the wrongful
act. 163
Sentencing of offenders is the last stage of punishment theory.' 64 It is
the one portion of the criminal process when the court can examine
individual culpability in relation to the offense committed. De-emphasizing
this consideration because of concerns that class may play a factor in the
sentence works to eliminate considerations unique to many corporate white
collar offenders. Sentencing needs to remain fluid to account for all
considerations and yet also be transparent for review. Most importantly, we
need to infuse into the sentencing process some of the sociological
teachings that started the discussion of white collar crime.' 65 It is important
to strive for a sentencing system that is classless, but in doing so it is also
important to respect real differences. 1
66
162 Id. at 5.
163 Id. at 6.
164 The prior stages are the creation of the law that defines a criminal act, the police or
prosecution's decision to investigate and arrest an individual for the alleged commission of
the defined crime, and the eventual prosecution of that individual for the crime. All of these
stages act to further punishment theory or are created for the purpose of furthering
punishment theory.
165 The Honorable Jed Rakoff refers to using "common sense" to counter the "utter
travesty of justice that sometimes results from the guidelines' fetish with abstract
arithmetic." Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
166 Recognizing white collar offenders as criminally subject to prosecution was an
important step made by the sociological world in 1939. It is equally important today. In
criminalizing this conduct, however, we have gone to the other extreme with sentencing that
fails to consider real differences in white collar crime. A biased system premised on the
wealth of the accused should not be tolerated, but equally offensive is a system that fails to
fully factor into the constellation the characteristics of the offender, the uniqueness of the
specific offense, and the future dangerousness of the offender. The deficiencies in the
system with respect to non-white collar offenders should not be used as the basis for
punishing the white collar offender.
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